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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-1342
___________
WAYNE B. MITTON,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-07399)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
____________________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on October 27, 2016
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 28, 2016)
OPINION *
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Before this Court is Wayne Mitton’s appeal of the Order of the District Court,
affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that denied him

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401434, and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I.

Background
Mitton fractured his right wrist in 2006 and was hospitalized due to suicidal

thoughts and depression in 2008. Afterward, Mitton continued to experience physical
and mental symptoms and to receive medical treatment, as detailed in the April 22, 2013
opinion of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). In April 2009, Mitton filed
applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under
the Social Security Act, alleging a disability onset date of June 6, 2008. Applying our
five-step test pursuant to Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999), and relying
on the testimony of a vocational expert who stated that Mitton could work as a mail clerk
or as an inspector and hand packager, the ALJ found that Mitton was not disabled on
June 6, 2008 or at any point after. Accordingly, Mitton’s applications for Disability
Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income were denied.
Mitton requested review of the ALJ’s decision in the District Court, which
affirmed the Commissioner’s disability determination. We are now called upon to review
that affirmance by the District Court.
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II.

Discussion 1
Two issues are presented by this appeal: (1) whether, in relying on the vocational

expert’s testimony to determine that Mitton was not disabled, the ALJ did not recognize
and properly consider a conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), and (2) whether sufficient evidence
supported the ALJ’s ultimate disability determination. Our review is plenary over these
legal issues, Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012), and we
address both in turn.
First, we perceive no error in the ALJ’s reliance on the vocational expert’s
testimony. The ALJ found, as required by Social Security Ruling 00-4p, that the
testimony was consistent with the DOT, and the ALJ thereby fulfilled his responsibility
to address and to resolve any possible conflict. See SSR 00-4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,759,
75,760 (Dec. 4, 2000). Although there is an argument that the vocational expert’s
testimony conflicted with the DOT listings for “mail clerk” and for “inspector and hand
packager,” that argument rests on inaccurately characterizing the DOT listings as
requiring frequent handling with both hands. The listings impose no such bilateral
requirement. See Emp’t & Training Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of
Occupational Titles § 209.687-026 (4th ed. 1991), 1991 WL 671813 (“mail clerk”); id.
§ 559.687-074, 1991 WL 683797 (“inspector and hand packager”); accord Carey v.
Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir. 2000). For that reason, despite acknowledging that

1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

Mitton had only occasional grasping and holding capabilities in one of his hands, the
vocational expert stated that Mitton could work as a mail clerk, or as an inspector and
hand packager, by using his unaffected hand more frequently. Because that statement
does not conflict with the relevant DOT listings, the ALJ’s reliance on the vocational
expert’s testimony was permissible.
Second, we conclude substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s ultimate disability
determination. We apply the same standard of review as the District Court to assess
whether the ALJ’s disability determination is supported by substantial evidence, see 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Hagans, 694 F.3d at 292. Substantial evidence “is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 503 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the
factual inquiry differently.” Hagans, 694 F.3d at 292 (quoting Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Here, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Mitton was not
disabled. As the ALJ observed in his opinion, Mitton testified that he regularly
performed a wide array of indoor and outdoor household chores, such as making his bed,
loading the dishwasher, taking out the garbage, mowing the lawn, and taking care of the
pool. Mitton even testified that he had no difficulty with fine manipulation, such as when
tying his shoes. Given this record, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion
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that Mitton could work as a mail clerk or as an inspector and hand packager and, thus,
that he was not disabled.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err in affirming the

Commissioner’s denial of Mitton’s applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income, and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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